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ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to shed light on the growing threat 
maritime piracy has on the economy along with possible 
solutions (military and diplomatic operations) the world 
can take to combat this threat.  Maritime piracy has been 
around since the beginning of time.  As the first sea going 
vessels entered the water, there were pirates attempting to 
pillage their goods.  In the twenty first century, the 
country of Somalia has become the major hub of operations 
for maritime pirates.  They operate mainly in the Gulf of 
Aden and the Horn of Africa (HOA). 
Maritime piracy will never be completely eradicated, 
but through diplomatic and military means the threat can be 
greatly reduced.  The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) 
keeps detailed records of each attack in order to establish 
trends and assistance in eradicating the threat of maritime 
piracy.  While the overall impact of piracy has yet to be 
determined, the fact remains that sea piracy, either 
directly or indirectly, affects citizens on an 
international level.  Although this problem will likely 
never be completely eradicated, it is necessary, through 
means of collaborative diplomacy and military forces; to 
work together internationally in order to decrease the 
impact maritime piracy has on global society. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
While many people believe piracy to be something 
daring and magical, as depicted through Disney movies, the 
reality is that piracy is a real and ever-growing threat to 
seafarers. Ships of all trade, military or civilian, are at 
the risk of attack at any given moment, and pirates are 
becoming more and more ruthless in their actions. Piracy 
affects its victims in many ways, including emotionally and 
physically.  One of the most important and least understood 
impacts of piracy is its financial cost.  This thesis will 
seek to answer the questions, what are the overall 
financial impacts that piracy has on global economies?  How 
does this financial impact affect the United States Navy, 
and possibly affect its capability to provide homeland 
defense and security?  And, what are possible solutions to 
combat this threat?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Researching this impact would provide relevant 
information regarding the true impact of piracy overall. 
United States policymakers are aware of the growing threat 
piracy creates.  In fact, “some members of the 111th 
Congress have expressed concern about the threat posed by 
piracy, and President Obama has stated that his 




the Horn of Africa region.”1  Furthermore, “the Obama 
Administration has outlined its policy response to the 
threat of piracy and pledged to continue working through 
interagency and multilateral coordination and enforcement 
mechanisms established during the Bush Administration.”2   
C. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are many different aspects of piracy, and with 
the passage of time and changes in technology, it can be 
difficult to distinguish piracy from other types of 
criminal behavior. In order to accurately determine the 
financial cost of piracy, and to identify ways to combat 
this problem, we must first agree on a definition.  This 
thesis will use the definition found in the United Nations 
Law of the Sea convention (LOS), which defines piracy as:  
Consisting of any of the following: (a) any 
illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act 
of depredation, committed for private ends by the 
crew or the passengers of a private ship or a 
private aircraft, and directed: (i) On the high 
seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board such ship or 
aircraft; (ii) Against a ship, aircraft, persons, 
or property in a place outside the jurisdiction 
of any state; (b) Any act of voluntary 
participation in the operation of a ship or of an 
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a 
pirate ship or aircraft; (c) Any act of inciting 
or of intentionally facilitating an act described 
in subparagraph (a) or (b).3  
                     
1 Lauren Ploch, Christopher M. Blanchard, Ronald O’Rourke, R. Chuck 
Mason, and Rawle O. King, “Piracy off the Horn of Africa,” 
Congressional Research Service, 28 September 2009, “SUMMARY” page. 
2 Ibid. 





Following these guidelines allows us to determine from 
available sources if someone is engaging in piracy-like 
behaviors, which in turn makes it easier to relate pirate 
occurrences to their financial impact.  
After identifying pirates, it is important to 
understand the different methods by which pirates attack. 
While methods of pirate attacks differ, the literature on 
maritime piracy describes four major types of attacks.  
These four types include: robbery of a vessel at sea, 
hijacking of vessels, kidnapping for ransom, and attacks on 
vessels berthed in harbors or at anchor.4  Each of these 
methods illustrates the link between financial issues and 
piracy.   
First, robbery at sea: with more than 3,600 acts of 
international piracy and armed robbery at sea between 1998 
and 2008, it is important to observe exactly how the acts 
were carried out, as well as what the end results were 
(successful/unsuccessful).5 This is vital information 
because it provides specific details involving what types 
of people were involved in the piracy, as well as what 
their ultimate goals were; and, most important for this 
thesis, this information often suggests that acts of piracy 
are committed for financial motives.  For example, in 1997 
the Asian Financial Crisis led many civilians to explore 
alternative options to supplement lost income, including 
                     
4 Catherine Zara Raymond, “Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca 
Strait: A Problem Solved?” Naval War College Review, Vol. 62, No. 3 
(Summer 2009): 31–42. 
5 Matthew Chambers, “International Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea,” 





turning to piracy.6  Rather than changing careers to piracy, 
these citizens were desperate to make ends meet and their 
pirate behaviors lasted for a short period of time. In 
turn, during the late 1990s and early into the new 
millennium, there was increased speculation that terrorists 
and pirates could begin to collaborate in their efforts. In 
fact, when al-Qaida launched its attack on the twin towers, 
they were noted as “demonstrating that ordinary means of 
transportation could be utilized to carry out large-scale 
attacks on economically important targets.”7  
Second, the threat of vessels being hijacked was 
vividly demonstrated on 15 November 2008, when a Saudi 
supertanker, the “Sirius Star,” was captured by Somalia 
pirates more than 450 nautical miles off the coast of 
Kenya.  The ship was valued at over $150 million while the 
value of the oil on board was valued at around $100 
million.  The Somali pirates demanded a ransom of $3 
million, which was parachuted on board after more than two 
months of negotiations.8 This is a perfect example of how 
piracy affects the economy globally. Including the ransom 
amounts, companies can expect to pay well into six figures 
for consultants, legal expenses, and cost of delivery of 
the ransom, according to Clive Stoddart, head of the kidnap 
and ransom team at Lloyd’s broker Aon.  Mr. Stoddart 
advises ship owners to review their insurance coverage, if 
transiting the Gulf of Aden or parts of the Indian Ocean, 
                     
6 Raymond, “Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait.” 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ndumbe J. Anyu and Samuel Moki, “Africa: the Piracy Hot Spot and 
Its Implications for Global Security,” Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 




in order to ensure they have an adequate policy to cover 
them in the case they are attacked by pirates.9 
The third and fourth methods used in high profile 
attacks were kidnapping crews and attacking ships in port 
and at anchor.  In some cases, companies were forced to pay 
ransoms, which in turn not only encouraged more 
kidnappings, but eventually funded weaponry and artillery 
to be used in future attacks. In one particular pirate 
attack, the ransom was tracked through Kenya and Ethiopia 
in forms of real estate.10   
In addition to the cost associated with methods of 
piracy, the financial impact of piracy is growing due to 
the extended reach of pirates in the early 21st century. 
Due to the increased patrols that navies are conducting, 
Somali pirates are now pursing new areas in which to 
operate.  According to Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, head of the 
U.S. naval forces in Africa, the fact that “pirates are 
operating as far as the Seychelles—nearly 900 miles from 
Somalia—to some extent shows how effective international 
anti-piracy efforts have become.”11  Admiral Fitzgerald also 
noted that there are not enough ships to be everywhere: 
“we’ve seen [pirates] as far as India, in the Mozambique 
Channel down south.  We could put fleets of ships out there 
                     
9 “Pirates Resume Activity-and widen their net,” 
http://www.lloyds.com/News_Centre/Features_from_Lloyds/News_and_feature
s_2009/Market_news/Pirates_resume_activity_and_widen_their_net.htm 
(accessed May 10, 2010). 
10 Christopher P. Cavas, “To Fight Pirates, Follow the Money: U.S. 
Admiral,” Defense News, 19 April 2010, 28. 




… and we still wouldn’t be able to cover the whole ocean.”12  
Clamping down on the activities of Somali pirates off the 
Horn of Africa will require international navies to target 
the brigands’ motherships and governments to go after the 
financial backers of such groups, maritime analysts say.13  
From January to May 2010, there have been a total of 116 
pirate attacks, 20 vessel hijackings and 389 hostages taken 
worldwide. “Sixty-five of those attacks took place off the 
Horn of Africa, involving 17 hijackings and 362 hostages.”14  
Due to the increased piracy operations, and the pirates’ 
ability to operate further off their coast (up to 1,000 
nautical miles), the trade routes have been affected to 
various countries such as Kenya.15  
The financial costs of piracy are also being driven 
upwards by the costs of defensive measures.  For example, 
the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea saw a 123 percent increase 
in pirate attacks from 2007-2008.16 This is important 
because while United States flagged ships have rarely been 
targeted, ships transporting goods to and from the United 
States have been attacked in these waters. This makes 
piracy a global concern. Approximately 12 percent of the 
world’s petroleum passes through this specific waterway, 
which is considered one of the busiest and most important 
                     
12 Christopher P. Cavas, “To Fight Pirates, Follow the Money: U.S. 
Admiral,” Defense News, 19 April 2010, 28. 
13 David Pugliese, “Experts: Target Pirates’ Motherships, 
Financing,” Defense News, 3 May 2010, 24. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Matthew Chambers, “International Piracy and Armed Robbery at 





waterways in the world. If a ship were to fall under attack 
here, the financial obligations can fall to the flag state 
of the vessel, to the various states of nationality of the 
seafarers taken hostage, the regional coastal states, owner 
states, cargo owners, or even the destination states.17  
Attacks here can cause environmental damage as well and 
eventually cause an increase in vessel operating costs to 
provide sufficient support and defenses.18  The cost to 
clean up any environmental damage incurred from a pirate 
attack can fall to any or a combination of the 
aforementioned parties. 
Although piracy involves many kinds of economic costs, 
there is no consensus in the literature on just how high that 
cost is.  According to Stephanie Hanson, Council on Foreign 
Relations, “there is no quantitative research available on the 
total cost of global piracy.”19 Hanson writes that: 
Estimates vary widely because of disagreement 
over whether insurance premiums, freight rates, 
and the cost of reroutings should be included 
with, for instance, the cost of ransoms.  Some 
analysts suggest the cost is close to $1 billion 
a year, while others claim losses could range as 
high as $16 billion.20   
Other scholars estimate the possible range of the cost 
of piracy to global maritime commerce as between $500 
                     
17 National Security Council, “Countering Piracy Off the Horn of 
Africa: Partnership & Action Plan,” (December 2008): 4. 
18 Matthew Chambers, “International Piracy and Armed Robbery at 
Sea,” RITA Bureau of Transportation Statistics: Special Report (April 
2010): 3. 
19 Stephanie Hanson, “Combating Maritime Piracy,” 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/18376/#p2 (accessed May 15, 2010).   
20 Stephanie Hanson, “Combating Maritime Piracy,” 




million and $25 billion per year.21  My thesis is intended 
to expand and improve on this research.  
D. PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Responses to the problem of maritime piracy can be 
seen as taking place at two levels: at the level of the 
international community, and at the level of individual 
naval operations.  At the international level, due to the 
“damage” piracy is inflicting on the commercial shipping 
business, the United Nations Security Council passed four 
resolutions: 1816, 1838, 1846, and 1851.  Resolution 1816 
was created on 2 June 2008 and allows naval forces 
cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government of 
Somalia to pursue pirates into Somalia’s ungoverned 
territorial waters.22  Resolution 1838 was passed in October 
of 2008 and focused on the concern organizations were 
having towards pirate attacks aimed at the World Food 
Program shipments to Somalia.23  Resolution 1846 was adopted 
on 2 December 2008 and recommended that the 1988 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Convention (which protects the 
safety of ships and the security of their passengers and 
crews from unlawful, threatening acts) can be applied in 
                     
21 Lesley Anne Warner, “Pieces of Eight: An Appraisal of U.S. 
Counterpiracy Options in the Horn of Africa,” Naval War College Review, 
Vol. 63, No. 2 (Spring 2010): 16.  On the debate over the cost of 
maritime piracy, see also: Arthur Bowring, “The Price of Piracy,” The 
Wall Street Journal, November 25, 2008; J. Peter Pham, “The Pirate 
Economy,” ForeignPolicy.com, April 2009, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/04/12/the_pirate_economy; 
and Michael D. Greenberg, et al., Maritime Terrorism: Risk and 
Liability (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006). 
22 Commander James Kraska, “Grasping “The Influence Of Law On Sea 
Power” Naval War College Review, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Summer 2009): 129.   
23 Commander James Kraska, “Grasping “The Influence Of Law On Sea 




the extradition and prosecution of pirates.24  Resolution 
1851 was created two weeks later, authorizing states to 
take action against safe havens utilized by pirates ashore 
in Somalia.25  Upon the adoption of these four new UN 
Security Council Resolutions, the United Kingdom and the 
United States signed a cooperative counter-piracy agreement 
with Kenya.26  Upon signing the agreement, the United States 
conducted the first transfer of a group of individuals 
recently captured on suspicion of conducting piracy 
operations to Kenya for trial. 
Navies around the world have joined the United States 
in revamping their patrols on the open ocean.  Countries 
have taken an increased interest in not only defending 
their commercial shipping vessels, but also protecting the 
routes they utilize in order to deliver their goods.  Due 
to the fact that Somalian pirates are indiscriminate to 
what vessels they attack, any and all vessels are at risk 
of being hijacked or attacked.  The only concern to pirates 
is the ransom which will eventually be paid in order to 
release the crew and vessel.  For these reasons, several 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, China, India and the 
United States, have increased not only increased awareness 
and concern for this issue, but have also taken active role 
in patrolling waterways to help combat this threat. 
At the level of U.S. naval operations, according to 
Admiral Fitzgerald, there are two new United States Navy 
                     
24 Commander James Kraska, “Grasping “The Influence Of Law On Sea 






ship types that have either been utilized or are planned to 
be utilized to assist with the anti-piracy efforts.27  One 
of the platforms currently in use is the SSGN (Ship, 
Submersible, Guided Missile, Nuclear powered) special 
operations/cruise missile nuclear submarine.  Going in to 
few details (due to the sensitivity of the missions), 
Admiral Fitzgerald noted that “this submarine has been used 
in the Somali basin and has proven to be a very effective 
platform.”28  The second type of Navy platform he is 
planning on utilizing is the new Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS).29  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Resources such as periodicals, scholarly journal, 
ships logs, and reputable news organizations have been 
utilized.  I have also contacted Terry R. McKnight, Rear 
Admiral USN (retired), who is highly knowledgeable in terms 
of piracy, for background information and advice throughout 
my research. His most recent tour of duty prior to retiring 
was the commander of Combined Task Force 151.  Combined 
Task Force 151 (CTF-151) was established by Combined 
Maritime Forces (CMF) and assigned the primary task of 
counter-piracy operations.  Once all research is compiled, 
information will be organized into sections covering the 
cost of defensive measures, the cost of offensive measures, 
and other related topics that further support the financial 
impact of piracy on the world.  
                     






James Kraska writes that “More than 90 percent of 
global trade is conducted over the sea-lanes.  Ensuring 
maritime security requires a concerted effort among 
littoral and coastal states, landlocked and port states, 
and especially flag states, working in conjunction with 
international organizations and the maritime industry.”30  
Counter-piracy operations are an ever-growing task for the 
United States military and their allies.  “Piratical 
attacks in the Gulf of Aden expose civil shipping to 
dangers not experienced since the Iran-Iraq ‘tanker war’ of 
the 1980s.”31  Being a Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) in the 
United States military, I take an amplified interest in the 
current and future problems that acts of maritime piracy 
create. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I will be the introduction, discussing the 
questions to be examined, the importance of the topic, and 
reviewing the literature.  Chapter II will be a brief 
history and overview of maritime piracy.  Chapter III will 
focus on the economic impact of maritime piracy, and 
Chapter IV will discuss possible solutions to the growing 
threat of piracy.  Chapter V will provide conclusions and 
present recommendations for U.S. policy. 
                     
30 Commander James Kraska, “Grasping ‘The Influence Of Law On Sea 
Power,’” Naval War College Review Vol. 62 No. 3 (Summer 2009): 123. 
31 Commander James Kraska, “Grasping ‘The Influence Of Law On Sea 








II. BRIEF HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF MARITIME PIRACY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this section is to explore the history 
of maritime piracy. Throughout the overview, I will discuss 
how maritime piracy has evolved, as well as note where the 
“hot” areas are presently in the world.  I will also 
address how the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa (HOA) 
regions have become increased areas of pirate attacks.  We 
finally note that the country of origin for almost all of 
these pirates is Somalia. 
B. PIRACY: AN OLD-FASHIONED STRATEGY 
Piracy has been a part of societal concern long before 
colonial times.  Contrary to popular belief, the first 
noted act of piracy came even before the infamous Vikings.  
The Sea Peoples were the first documented pirates of the 
13th century, BC, who raided the Mediterranean and Aegean 
Seas.32  Scandinavian bandits later arrived during the 
Viking Age through the Early Middle Ages.  The 
Scandinavians, or Vikings, were famous for striking fear 
into the hearts of sea travelers near Western Europe and 
Northern Africa.  Because there was no majority rule in 
this area and villages suffered from political turmoil, 
this offered a breeding ground for these particular 
brigands to thrive.  If the Vikings were not occupied 
terrorizing towns and cities, they were capturing European 
                     
32 Edberhard Zangger, “Who Were The Sea People?,” 
http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/199503/who.were.the.sea.people..h




ships which were out to sea.  They would loot them for all 
their valuables before capturing the ship and/ or killing 
the crew. 
Piracy truly began when commerce expanded across large 
bodies of water.  Although sea trade began many years ago, 
it has evolved with development of new technology.  
Although sea piracy has adapted through technological 
means, the principles remain the same.  Somalia pirates 
evolved from hijacking fishing vessels and stealing their 
catch, to quickly realizing there was a very lucrative 
future in targeting much larger commercial vessels.  They 
were able to successfully conduct these operations with the 
use of more sophisticated weapons and transportation as the 
basis of their adaptation to current trends.   
C. THE MODERN DAY PIRATE 
It is now common for modern day pirates to be highly 
trained fighters.  They utilize Rocket Propelled Grenades 
(RPGs), antitank missiles, automatic machine guns, hand 
grenades, global positioning systems (GPS), and satellite 
phones while at the same time utilizing a more modern and 
faster modes of transportation.  Use of radar has also 
increased the range off shore which pirates can now reach.  
This increased range has allowed the pirates a chance to 
capture the larger commercial ships, but has also enhanced 
the burden on ships, crew, and the owners of these ships or 
companies.  With the capture of larger ships, businesses 
are more willing to pay the ransom for which the pirates 




Unfortunately for companies, it is usually cheaper in 
the long run for them to pay out any ransoms than it is for 
them to lose their cargo along with their ship and 
crewmembers.  To illustrate this phenomenon, consider the 
case of the Saudi supertanker, the Sirius Star, and her 
crew when they experienced such a situation on 15 November 
2008,.  The supertanker and crew were captured by Somalia 
pirates more than 450 nautical miles off the coast of 
Kenya.  The ship had an estimated value of over $150 
million dollars.  The value of the oil on board the vessel 
was valued at around $100 million dollars.  The Somalia 
pirates demanded a ransom of $3 million dollars, which was 
parachuted on board after more than two months of 
negotiations.33   
By attacking larger ships, pirates were able to 
increase their ransom demands, and ultimately receive what 
they asked for.  This is a perfect example of how piracy 
impacts the economy globally.  Companies do not just hand 
over large amounts of cash and go on about their business.  
In reality, companies can expect to pay well into six 
figures for consultants, legal expenses, and cost of 
delivery of the ransom according to Clive Stoddart, head of 
the kidnap and ransom team at Lloyd’s broker Aon.  To 
ensure coverage, Stoddart advises ship owners to review 
their insurance coverage if vessels are transiting the Gulf  
 
 
                     
33 Ndumbe J. Anyu and Samuel Moki, “Africa: The Piracy Hot Spot and 





of Aden or parts of the Indian Ocean, thus securing an 
adequate policy to cover them in the case they are attacked 
by pirates.34 
The capture and release of the Sirius Star was a high 
profile attack with minimal damage.  Unfortunately, other 
high profile attacks not only caused damage to ships and 
cargo, but also involved kidnapping of crews, and in cases 
when companies were forced to pay ransoms, they not only 
encouraged more kidnappings and attacks, but eventually 
funded weaponry and artillery to be used in future attacks.  
In one particular pirate attack, the ransom was tracked 
through Kenya and Ethiopia in forms of real estate.  These 
investments were suspected of being used to house pirates, 
convicts, rebels, dirty money, weapons, etc.35  These 
investments ultimately support the pirates in their 
criminal endeavors.   
It was not until the Somalia civil war when Somalia 
rebels became a part of the piracy action, although they 
were earlier examples of piracy in Africa, such as that 
carried out by Nigerians in the 1970s and 1980s.  After 
battling in the civil war, the Harti and Tanade clans broke 
away from the country and formed their own self-governed 
state in the northeastern portion of the country and called 
it Puntland.  Puntland is the main base for these pirates.  
Currently there are approximately five gangs in this area.  
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Each pirate group comprises of a total of at least 1,000 
men ranging in age from 20–35 years of age.36  Since the 
formation of Puntland, Somalia’s coast has progressively 
climbed the chart as one of the most dangerous sea-lanes in 
the world in terms of maritime piracy.37  
The popularity and extreme success of piracy off the 
coast of Africa can be credited to three sources.  These 
three reasons are “poverty, the treaties governing maritime 
transport, and the absence of good governance or presences 
of failed states.”38  Some African countries have struggled 
to create not only an independent political structure, but 
an economic system to support it.  Africans in coastal 
states that were vulnerable to the vagaries of the world 
economy and highly dependent on commodity export prices 
also frequently lacked reliable access to educational and 
economic opportunities.  Thus, “illiteracy, a low standard 
of living, high rates of dependency, lack of opportunities 
for educational advancement, and a dependent economy 
contributed to the fostering of an overwhelming level of 
poverty in several African countries”, which continue to 
affect the region to this present day.39  When conditions 
became particularly tenuous, citizens of African coastal 
countries turned to the sea to find a new way to survive.  
Trade, both imports and exports and trade transported via 
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coastal maritime routes, was a major source of revenue for 
most of these countries.  As maritime trade picked up, some 
individuals, particularly where the rule of law was weak, 
realized that a valuable opportunity they presented itself.  
Raiding and looting of visiting and transiting ships or 
hijacking and then selling these newly acquired commodities 
for a profit became a way of life for some.40  
D. METHOD OF ATTACK 
As stated in the introduction, four main methods of 
pirate attack on commercial shipping have been observed.  
These four types include robbery of a vessel at sea, 
hijacking of vessels, kidnapping for ransom, and attacks on 
vessels berthed in harbors or at anchor.41  With more than 
3,600 acts of international piracy and armed robbery at sea 
between 1998 and 2008, it is important to observe exactly 
how the acts were carried out as well as what the end 
results were (successful/ unsuccessful).42  This is vital 
information because it provides specific details involving 
what types of people were involved in the piracy, as well 
as what their ultimate goals were.  For example, in 1997 
the Asian Financial Crisis led many civilians to explore 
alternative options to supplement lost income, including 
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turning to piracy.43  Fortunately, citizens did not change 
careers to piracy.  These individuals were desperate to 
make ends meet and their pirate behaviors lasted for a 
short period of time.  In turn, during the late 1990’s and 
early into the new millennium, there was increased 
speculation that terrorists and pirates could begin to 
collaborate their efforts.  In fact, when al-Qaida launched 
its attack on the twin towers, they were noted as 
“demonstrating that ordinary means of transportation could 
be utilized to carry out large scale attacks on 
economically important targets”.44  
Moreover, piracy became so successful because it was 
not only common practice, but also common knowledge, that 
commercial vessels traveled unarmed as well as traveling 
with a small efficient crew.  This small crew allowed the 
cost to transport the merchandise from port to port to 
remain relatively low.  Amateur pirates were aware of this 
information and used it to their advantage.  Commercial 
vessels became easy targets with an endless supply of 
income. 
Finally, in terms of maritime piracy, African 
government officials did very little to combat piracy.  The 
corruption of the African governments, along with these 
agencies ignoring the cry for help from the owners of the 
commercial vessels under attack, and the reality that 
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governments have assigned this problem a low priority 
status has only fueled the frequency of attacks.  When the 
pirates realized the corrupted governments were ignoring 
the crews cry for help, in a way they became more confident 
and not only increased the frequency of their attacks, but 
also increased the level of violence in their weapons they 
utilized.45 
E. THE MODERN DAY PIRATE: INCREASINGLY COMPLEX AND 
DANGEROUS 
Modern day pirates have steadily evolved.  Through the 
acquisition of advanced weaponry and technology, they have 
been able to attack larger sea-going vessels (whose values 
are estimated to be around several million dollars), and 
attack farther off the coast of Somalia, as noted in the 
Sirius Star example previously mentioned.  With these 
advancements, maritime piracy only expanded.    
While maritime piracy is steadily expanding, three 
distinct pirate groups have been found in Somalia.  These 
groups are “the Northern gang, based in Eyl; the Central 
gang, based in Hobyo; and the Southern gang, based in 
Harardera.”46  Interestingly, these groups originally relied 
on the fishing industry to make a living.  “Reports suggest 
that illegal fishing and dumping have disrupted Somalia’s 
coastal economy.”47  Due to this disruption, the Somalia 
pirates feel justified in their career changes to piracy.  
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United Nations (U.N.) Special Representative to Somalia 
Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, states that “poverty, lack of 
employment, environmental hardship, pitifully low incomes, 
reduction of pastoralist and maritime resources due to 
drought and illegal fishing and a volatile security and 
political situation all contribute to the rise and 
continuance of piracy in Somalia.”48  While maritime pirates 
parallel these charges, there are some differences.  In 
fact, “one of the unique characteristics of Somali piracy 
has been the taking of hostages for ransom.”49 
“Unlike pirate attacks in Strait of Malacca or 
Nigeria, where ships are boarded either to take the vessel 
or its contents, pirates off the Horn of Africa (HOA) 
routinely take the target vessel’s crew hostage in return 
for ransom payments.”50  One of the main reasons for this 
distinction in the type of attacks committed in these 
different regions is mainly a result of where the pirates 
operate from.  These particular pirates have a “sanctuary 
on land in Somalia and in its territorial waters from which 
they can launch pirate attacks and conduct ransom 
negotiations.”51   
Having this sanctuary is a key advantage that the 
Somalian pirates have in comparison to other piracy groups.  
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Other maritime pirates do not have similar, large safe 
havens in which they bring their hostages back in order to 
demand a ransom.  Most pirates operate directly from their 
vessels, which presents a problem when trying to negotiate 
for ransoms.  Unfortunately for these pirates, there are 
not many places to hide, nor do they have the 
accommodations to use as leverage in their negotiations 
with the hostages’ host countries.  Due to the sanctuary 
the Somali’s have, “this has presented maritime security 
forces with significant challenges to traditional 
engagement strategies and tactics.”52  Somalia, although 
still developing, is an internationally recognized country.  
This means that in order to conduct any type of operation 
to rescue hostages, governments agencies would have to 
coordinate with the Somalian government.  This would be a 
difficult task to accomplish given the fact that the 
government in Somalia is highly corrupted. 
The Somali government, following a checkered 
history of failed attempts at central government, 
finally collapsed in the early 1990s.53   
There have been several attempts, since the mid 1990s, 
by a number of countries to put forth an effort to try and 
establish a legitimate government in Somalia.  Some of 
these international efforts to rebuild and restructure 
Somalia “have included two United Nations sponsored 
peacekeeping missions, UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in 
Somalia) I and UNOSOM II, that were abandoned in the mid-
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1990s.”54  Apagar reports that,  “Currently, the African 
Union is conducting a UN sanctioned stability mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM).”55  The intent of AMISOM is to try and 
stabilize the security situation, including the 
take over from Ethiopian Forces, and to create a 
safe and secure environment in preparation for 
the transition to the UN”56 through a peaceful 
support operation.   
By establishing and maintaining a secure government, 
tribes can hope to slowly, but surely push out piracy in 
this region.  
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III. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MARITIME PIRACY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The threat of maritime piracy reaches all aspects of 
and around the Indian Ocean today.  The various companies 
shipping the merchandise, as well as the country of Somalia 
are equally at risk.  Included in these risks are damages 
to infrastructure.  Of the 195 countries in the world, each 
has its own individualized infrastructure.  Whether 
discussing hard or soft infrastructures, each caters to the 
country’s individual needs and expectations.  More 
specifically, in some scenarios other countries may find 
that they also rely on these particular infrastructures for 
their everyday functioning.  Discussed here are the hard 
infrastructures, or large physical networks necessary for 
functioning, within the country of Somalia.  In particular, 
we intend to identify information regarding the hard 
infrastructure of seaports as categorized under the 
transportation infrastructure, and how it is vulnerable to 
piracy.  In addition to addressing infrastructure 
vulnerabilities, this chapter will also discuss the overall 
cost of piracy as found by published records.  
In today's economy, the oceans have increased 
importance, allowing all countries to participate 
in the global marketplace.  More than 80 percent 
of the world's trade travels by water and forges 
a global maritime link.57   
                     
57 George W. Bush, The National Strategy for Maritime Security, 




While Somalia is still a developing country and not 
industrialized, because of its locality, citizens are able 
to import and export commodities easily, thus providing 
revenue to rebuild other necessary infrastructures.  With 
the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean surrounding the 
country, Somalian’s were able to build a total of four 
seaports for transporting and selling their goods.  With 
the means of maritime access in place, Somalia has found a 
way to earn a gross domestic product (GDP) value of 
approximately $5.6 billion.58  Unfortunately, these waters 
are also considered home to many pirates.  They attack all 
types of ships sailing or docking in these areas, and have 
been claimed to be some of the most dangerous waters in the 
world.  
B. SOMALIA MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 
The four major seaports of Somalia are Mogadishu, 
Berbera, Kismayo, and Bossaso.  Mogadishu is no longer 
active due to civil unrest, Kismayo is deemed closed to UN 
ships, while the remaining seaports “fall under independent 
port authorities set up by local clans.”59  This leaves two 
major seaports available for importing and exporting goods 
throughout the world.  Through these ports, Somalia has 
enabled a working partnership with the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), Yemen, and Saudi Arabia and exports various 
commodities to these countries.  These goods range anywhere 
from livestock, bananas, hides, fish, charcoal, to scrap 
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metal.  The UAE receives approximately 58 percent of 
Somalia’s exports while Yemen receives around 20 percent 
and Saudi Arabia about 4 percent.60  These exports generate 
nearly $300 million a year, while their imports are in the 
range of $798 million.61  
An important thing to note when addressing importing 
and exporting goods within the aforementioned countries is 
the stakeholders who take ownership in these transactions.  
According to the CIA World Fact Book, Somalia has one 
commercial shipping vessel and it is owned by the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE).62  This, in turn, means that Somalia’s 
maritime transportation system is primarily controlled by 
the United Arab Emirates.  While the UAE is able to 
capitalize on this situation, the Somalian government also 
benefits from having this vessel operate out of Berbera and 
Bossaso.  This UAE controlled commercial shipping vessel is 
the primary resource for all exported goods helping to 
generate a source of income for the country.  Somalia’s 
main source of imported goods comes from Djibuti, 29.2%, 
followed closesly by India, 11.9%.63  In this area in 
particular, the waterways serve as a vast commercial 
shipping highway where only “a handful of international 
straits and canals pass 75 percent of the world's maritime 
trade and half its daily oil consumption.  International 
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Commerce is at risk in the major trading hubs as well as at 
a handful of strategic chokepoints.”64  Also, approximately 
eight percent of the annual world trade passes through the 
Gulf of Aden, so it is in Somalia’s best interest to 
maintain these seaports.   
While trade amongst the UAE, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia 
offer opportunities for Somalia to develop, it also leaves 
the seaports vulnerable to environmental damage.  Not only 
can the ports suffer from the constant movement of vessels 
coming in and out, but this also leaves structures 
vulnerable to waste from ships.  Also, pirate attacks at 
these ports can cause environmental damage, leading to an 
increase in vessel operating costs to provide sufficient 
support and defenses.65  This forces Somalians to channel 
their income further into the seaport infrastructure, when 
it could be otherwise used to develop other necessary 
infrastructures. In a failed country it can be a daunting 
and challenging task to work on more than one 
infrastructure at a time. The easiest thing for Somalia to 
do is concentrate on rebuilding their seaport infrastrutre 
first. This will help generate a solid source of income.  
With a steady, increased income, Somalia can begin to 
finance other infrastructures that need support.  In the 
end this will create jobs for the Somalian citizens which 
will improve their quality of living as a whole. 
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With pirates claiming home in Somalia, the seaports of 
Berbera and Bossaso hold greater risks than environmental 
damage.  Not only does this problem affect Somalian clans, 
but it also affects those who import goods from this 
country.  “Clamping down on the activities of Somali 
pirates off the Horn of Africa will require international 
navies to target the brigands’ mother ships and governments 
to go after the financial backers of such groups, maritime 
analysts say.”66  Because Somalia does not have the 
infrastructure to support a strong military, international 
militaries have to intervene in solving this pirate issue.  
In fact, since 2005, 27 ships ported in Somalia have been 
hijacked by pirates and later used for hijacking additional 
ships.  This has caused the United States to ban all 
dockage of United Nations or humanitarian ships in 
Somalia.67 
The United States and the United Nations are not the 
only ones affected by the lack of defense for the seaport 
infrastructure.  “The World Food Program (WFP) ships tens 
of thousands of metric tons of food monthly to the Horn of 
Africa region.”68  Additionally, to pass through these 
dangerous waters, insurance companies require an additional 
$10,000-$20,000 fee which must be purchased prior to each 
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transit within these ports or waters to cover potential 
risks.69  With the increase in the cost to ship these 
commodities, a greater chance of being attacked by maritime 
pirates, and insufficient funding to these programs, this 
prompted the WFP to announce they would be closing feeding 
centers in Somalia.70  With the closing of these feeding 
centers, the potential for millions of not just Somalians, 
but citizens of other countries in the region, who rely on 
this program, to suffer or die from starvation is greatly 
increased.   
D. RISKS 
The pirates that operate out of the seaport 
infrastructures in Somalia offer a significant threat to 
vessels traveling to and from Somalia, as well as traveling 
through the Indian Ocean or the Gulf of Aden.  This has 
become an international problem.  We again note the 
infamous attack on the Saudi supertanker, the Sirius Star 
on 15 November 2008.  The Somalia pirates demanded a ransom 
of $3 million dollars, which was parachuted on board after 
more than two months of negotiations.71  Because oil from 
the Gulf is shipped all over the world to numerous 
countries, the lasting effects of this pirate attack can 
still be felt.  Furthermore, approximately seventeen 
tankers carrying in the region of 6.3 million barrels of 
crude oil and petroleum products transit the gulf each day.  
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This includes close to 30 percent of Europe’s oil and gas 
that passes through the gulf.72  Due to the increased piracy 
operations, along with the pirates’ ability to operate 
further off their coast (up to 1000 nautical miles), these 
particular seaports and trade routes have drastically 
affected countries on an international level.73  In the year 
2008 there were over 80 attacks (successful or attempted) 
on commercial vessels.   
Figure 1 illustrates the location of attacks (actual, 
attempted, suspicious vessel) during the year of 2008, and 
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Figure 1.   Derived from International Maritime Bureau 
Website74 
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Figure 2.   Derived from International Maritime Bureau 
Website75 
These attacks resulted in a loss of over $30 million. 
From January 2005–June 2010 there have been a total of 930 
attempted and actual attacks from Somali pirates around the 
world.76 
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Although the Unites States is not dependent on the 
sole commercial shipping vessel Somalia owns, the U.S. is 
reliant on the shipping lanes off the coast of Somalia.  
The United States, along with every other country shipping 
merchandise via the seas, has two options; they can assume 
the risk of a possible hijacking in the Gulf of Aden or 
they can reroute their ships through Cape of Good Hope.  If 
a merchant vessel is rerouted from a country in the Gulf 
(Saudi Arabia for example) through the Cape of Good Hope, 
they can expect approximately 2,700 miles added to their 
voyage.77  This longer distance will increase the annual 
operating cost of the vessel by reducing the delivery 
capacity for the ship from about six round-trip voyages to 
five voyages, or a drop of about 26 percent.  The 
additional fuel cost of traveling via the Cape of Good Hope 
is about $3.5 million annually.78  If the commercial vessel 
were departing from Europe instead of the Gulf, and 
transiting through the Cape of Good Hope instead of 
transiting the Suez Canal, the increased operating costs 
would be much greater.  This adds “An estimated additional 
$89 million annually, which includes $74.4 million in fuel 
and $14.6 million in charter expenses.  In addition, the 
rerouting would increase transit times by about 5.7 days 
per ship.  This would result in the need for an additional  
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vessel to maintain the service frequency.”79  These costs do 
not take into consideration what a longer transit time 
would do to the logistics side.  
E. COST 
Along with the increased costs incurred from the 
longer transit time and the $10–20,000 insurance premium 
for transiting the Gulf of Aden there are the following 
costs that may be involved as well: 
- “Paying ransoms, totaling between $30 million and 
$150 million in 2008 
- Paying ransom-delivery costs, negotiation fees, and 
lawyer fees 
- Hiring licensed private security guards (up to 
$60,000 for the voyage through the Gulf of Aden), as 
well as absorbing the additional insurance costs 
associated with embarked security teams or armed 
sailors 
- Installing nonlethal deterrent equipment and 
employing personnel to operate it, at a cost of 
$20,000 to $30,000 
- Paying higher wages to crews of vessels transiting 
waters where pirate attacks are considered likely 
- Sustaining a multinational naval presence in the 
Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, at a cost of between 
$250 million and $400 million per year”80 
The total amount a company can expect to pay, based 
off the statistic stated above, is anywhere between $283.6 
million to $639.1 million. 
The most recent hijacking involved a United States 
commercial shipping vessel, the MV Maersk Alabama.  The 
vessel remained under Somali pirate control until a U.S. 
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military interdiction on 12 April 2009.  The dramatic 
rescue of the Captain and crew of the MV Maersk Alabama 
“has emerged as the universal representation of the U.S. 
response to piracy.”81  The threat of maritime piracy off 
the coast of Somalia is so great it causes shipping 
companies to divert their vessels through the Cape of Good 
Hope, which again results in increased costs. 
Due to the effects maritime piracy has on the global 
shipping industry, it is the job of the navies around the 
world to patrol the oceans and protect the freedom of the 
seas.   
Table 1 displays the nationality of the ships attacked 
between January and June 2005–2010. 
 
Flag State 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Antigua Barbuda 5 6 3 8 12 6 
Antilles 
Netherlands 1 1     
Australia  1     
Bahamas 5 2 1 3 9 3 
Barbados    1   
Belgium     1  
Bermuda      1 
Belize    1   
Brazil   1  1  
Bulgaria      1 
Cambodia   1    
Canary Island    1   
Cayman Island 2 1   1  
China 1 1 1  1 1 
Comoros   1    
Croatia     1  
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Flag State 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Cyprus 5 2 5 9 8 3 
Denmark 1  3 1 2 1 
Egypt 1  1  3  
Ethiopia     1  
France  1  3 1 2 
Georgia 1      
Germany  1  1 5 1 
Gibraltar   1 2 1  
Greece     5  
Guyana   1    
Honduras   1    
Hong Kong (SAR) 4 3 3 2 12 5 
India 4 5 3 1 4 5 
Indonesia 1 4 1 1 1 2 
Iran 1     1 
Isle Of Man  3 1 4 1 2 
Italy     6 3 
Jamaica      1 
Japan 2  1 2   
Jordan  1 1 1   
Liberia 7 11 12 7 22 28 
Libya     1  
Lithuania      1 
Luxemburg   1    
Malaysia 7 8 2 3 1 7 
Maldives 2      
Malta 3 5 4 2 16 10 
Marshall 
Islands 5 5 8 10 18 18 
Myanmar 1 1 1    
Netherlands 
Antilles     3  
Netherlands 2 2 2 2 3 1 
Nigeria   1 1   
North Korea     4 2 
Norway 1 1 3 4 2 1 
Oman  1     
Pakistan 1    2 1 




Flag State 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Philippines 1 2  4 1  
Portugal   1    
Qatar   2    
Russia  1   1  
South Korea  3  2 1 3 
Saudi Arabia     1 1 
Seychelles 
Islands     2 1 
Sierra Leone      1 
Singapore 16 12 12 9 15 22 
Spain     1 2 
St. Kitts & 
Nevis   2  2  
St. Vincent 
Grenadines 5 5 3 3 5 2 
Suriname   1    
Switzerland  1     
Taiwan   1 1 1 5 
Tanzania   2  1  
Thailand 2 1 2 1 2 4 
Togo     1  
Turkey  2 2 1 4 2 
Tuvalu  1    1 
UAE   3 1   
Ukraine    1   
United Kingdom 4 3  1 3 4 
USA 4 1  4 2  
Vanuatu 1 2     
Vietnam 3    3 1 
Yemen    2 5 5 
Not Stated 4 4 4  1  
Total for six 
months 127 127 126 114 240 196 
Total year end 276 239 263 293 406  
Table 1.  Derived from International Maritime Bureau 
Quarterly Reports82 
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Many believe that the impact piracy has on a country’s 
economy is mainly felt regionally, i.e., places such as 
Somalia, Nigeria, Indonesia, Tanzania, India and 
Bangladesh.83  Somalia has a tactical advantage in the way 
they are able to become such a dominant figure in the 
piracy business.  The coastline of Somalia is thirty-three-
hundred-kilometers (approximately 2,051 miles) and it 
borders one of the busiest and major trade routes in the 
world, the Gulf of Aden.  The Gulf of Aden is the first 
step in which twenty thousand ships pass each year to go to 
and from the Suez Canal.  Not to mention, approximately 
seventeen tankers carrying in the region of 6.3 million 
barrels of crude oil and petroleum products transit the 
gulf each day.  This does not include the close to 30 
percent of Europe’s oil and gas that passes through the 
gulf.84   
The Gulf of Aden is one of, if not the busiest 
waterway in the world.  As mentioned earlier, nearly 12 
percent of the world’s petroleum passes through the Gulf of 
Aden.85  It is extremely hard to determine the exact impact 
piracy has on the world economy.  “There is no definitive 
breakdown of the true economic cost of piracy, either in 
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absolute or relative terms.”86  There have been many 
different figures thrown around predicting the approximate 
range of money, which has been lost due to this growing 
issue.  This spectrum is anywhere from $1 billion to $50 
billion, with the later value being way off the mark.87   
Several analysts believe the allocation of the world’s 
resources used to combat the growing threat of piracy is 
not being utilized in the right manner.  Piracy has not 
been declared, nor is considered a major economic threat; 
yet there are over 14 international navies dispatching 
ships to the Horn of Africa to combat these pirates.  With 
the estimation of a daily operating cost per ship to be 
around $50,000 a day, it does not appear the cost to combat 
this problem outweighs the impact the pirates have on the 
global economy.88  This means that countries should be 
willing to put forth a financial effort towards military 
and diplomatic operations, focusing on a primary goal of 
ending or severely decreasing the threat of maritime 
piracy.  Somali pirates make upwards of a couple million 
dollars in ransom money for each successful commercial 
vessel takeover.  It does not seem countries around the 
world are taking the maritime piracy threat seriously when 
they are not even spending a third of what the pirates are 
making in ransoms to patrol the high seas. 
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Piracy has been, currently is, and will continue to be 
a real threat to seafarers.  The approximately three-
quarters of the world is covered by water in which “50,000 
large ships, which carry 80 percent of the world’s trade 
cargo.”89   
Due to the vast size of the ocean, the opportunity for 
piracy is overwhelming.  At the beginning stages, Somalian 
pirates focused mainly in areas of the ocean that were 
close to seaports in order to attack ships.  As countries 
started fighting back, along with the pirates acquiring 
more advanced weapons and vessels; pirates have started to 
move farther out to sea away from seaports to conduct their 
attacks.  Unlike land and air, the high seas have been and 
currently are scarcely patrolled.  The total number of 
attempted or successful pirate attacks is hard to 
effectively pinpoint.  The main reason for this is because 
many “shipping companies do not report incidents of piracy, 
for fear of raising their insurance premiums and prompting 
protracted, time-consuming investigations.”90  Based off 
this information, the total damage due to cost of ransoms, 
loss of merchandise or damage to the vessel and rise in 
insurance costs now amounts to $16 billion per year.91  The 
cost to insure a vessel has now more than quadrupled. 
Another important factor in addressing economic 
concerns in relation to piracy is the cost of defensive 
measures. An example of defensive measures include hiring 
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private security to sail with the vessel or installing 
defensive equipment such as the Long Range Acoustic Device 
(LRAD).  The LRAD is a non lethal defensive measure which 
emits a high frequency noise which can disorient and cause 
temporary loss of hearing for would be assailants.  The 
LRAD can also play warning messages in various languages.   
The Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea saw a 123 percent 
increase in pirate attacks from 2007-2008.92  This is 
important because while United States flagged ships have 
rarely been targeted, ships transporting goods to and from 
the United States have been attacked in these waters.  This 
makes piracy a global concern.  If a ship were to fall 
under attack here, the financial obligations fall to the 
flag state of the vessel, various states of nationality of 
the seafarers taken hostage, regional coastal states, owner 
states, cargo owners, or destination states.93  Attacks here 
can cause environmental damage as well and eventually cause 
an increase in vessel operating costs to provide sufficient 
support and defenses.94 
According to Stephanie Hanson, Council on Foreign 
Relations, “there is no quantitative research available on 
the total cost of global piracy.”  She goes on to state 
that: 
                     
92 Matthew Chambers, “International Piracy and Armed Robbery at 
Sea,” RITA Bureau of Transportation Statistics: Special Report (April 
2010): 1. 
93 National Security Council, “Countering Piracy Off the Horn of 
Africa: Partnership & Action Plan,” (December 2008): 4. 
94 Matthew Chambers, “International Piracy and Armed Robbery at 





Estimates vary widely because of disagreement 
over whether insurance premiums, freight rates, 
and the cost of reroutings should be included 
with, for instance, the cost of ransoms.  Some 
analysts suggest the cost is close to $1 billion 
a year, while others claim losses could range as 
high as $16 billion.95 
This $1 billion to $16 billion a year loss is not 
including the multi-million dollar ransoms, the increase in 
insurance rates, the cost to strengthen and improve onboard 
security, the cost to repair any damages incurred from an 
attack along with the increase in fuel and crew cost to 
take a safer but longer route.  “In May 2008, insurance 
underwriters at the Lloyds of London designated the Gulf of 
Aden a “war-risk” zone subject to a special insurance 
premium.”96  This “war-risk” zone insurance is the 
additional $10,000-$20,000 fee that needs to be purchased 
prior to each transit through the Suez Canal and the Gulf 
of Aden.97  The exact cost of the additional insurance is 
not known due to the competitive nature of the various 
insurance companies. 
Not only is there a financial cost incurred from a 
maritime pirate attack, there is also the tragic human cost 
which cannot be overlooked.  “Piratical attacks off the 
Horn of Africa constitute a threat to the lives and welfare 
of the citizens and seafarers of many nations.”98  All it 
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takes is one maritime attack to question seafarers’ 
confidence in the security in the global shipping lanes.  
“A single piratical attack often affects the interests of 
numerous countries, including the flag State of the vessel, 
various States of nationality of the seafarers taken 
hostage, regional coastal States, owner States, and cargo 
owner, transshipment, and destination States.”99   
In January 2009 the United States established the 
Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151).  The U.S. Navy and Coast 
Guard “participate directly in CTF 151, which operates in 
the Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia ―to 
actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to 
protect global maritime security and secure freedom of 
navigation for the benefit of all nations.”100  Besides CTF 
151, there are other established world organizations that 
are conducting anti-piracy operations off the coast of 
Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.  Some of these operations 
include “European Union Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR) Operation 
Atalanta (full operationally capable February 2009) and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operation Ocean 
Shield (August 2009).”101  
The impact maritime piracy has off the coast of 
Somalia is recognized in the world to be a significant 
threat.  This threat is not only to the operating cost but 
also to the safety of their commercial shipping vessels 
operation in the waters around Somalia.  This is why 
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several operations have been established to counter this 
threat.  Military operations are not the only way maritime 


















IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE GROWING THREAT OF 
PIRACY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the rise in relevancy of maritime piracy, there 
have been several different recommendations on how the 
United States and other cooperating nations could combat 
this growing threat, yet they so far seem to fall short of 
addressing this problem.  These include extending 
diplomacy, while others offered more military presence in 
piracy-afflicted waters. This chapter aims at presenting 
some of the proposed ripostes to piracy as well as the 
advantages of using a combination of both diplomatic and 
military means. More importantly, this chapter focuses on 
this combination in operations off the coast of Somalia and 
in the Gulf of Aden. 
B. RESPONSE TO MARITIME PIRACY 
Somalia is a country that can be classified as a 
failed state.  Here there is a legitimate national 
government, but they are unable to effectively make 
decisions and make them stick, though there are various 
local governments which control the day to day operations 
throughout the country.  With a lack of effective national 
governance, Somalia has become a breeding ground for 
piracy. Thus, the use of military patrols or operations 
combined with a diplomatic approach will help bring an end 
to the piracy threat off the coast of Somalia.   
Responses to maritime piracy can be seen under two 




community and national naval operations.  The damage piracy 
is inflicting on the commercial shipping business falls 
into an area of concern for the entire international 
community.  This response led the United Nations Security 
Council to pass four resolutions: 1816, 1838, 1846 and 
1851.  Resolution 1816 was created on 2 June 2008 and 
allows naval forces cooperating with the Transitional 
Federal Government of Somalia to pursue pirates into 
Somalia’s ungoverned territorial waters.102  Resolution 1838 
was passed in October of 2008 and focuses on the concerns 
that organizations have towards pirate attacks aimed at the 
World Food Program shipments to Somalia.103  Resolution 1846 
was adopted on 2 December 2008 and recommended that the 
1988 Suppression of Unlawful Acts Convention (which 
protects the safety of ships and the security of their 
passengers and crews from unlawful, threatening acts) can 
be applied in the extradition and prosecution of pirates.104  
Resolution 1851 was created two weeks later, authorizing 
states to take action against safe havens utilized by 
pirates ashore in Somalia.105   
Upon the adoption of these four new UN Security 
Council Resolutions, the United Kingdom and the United 
States signed a cooperative counter-piracy agreement with 
Kenya.106  After signing the agreement, the United States 
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conducted the first transfer of a group of individuals 
recently captured on suspicion of conducting piracy 
operations to Kenya for trial. 
Dutch Rear Admiral Hank Ort, the Chief of Staff of 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Maritime 
Command in Northwood, England stated “Somali pirates are 
having fewer successful attacks against merchant ships, but 
the number of pirate groups is on the rise.”107  Due to the 
summer’s seasonal monsoons in the Horn of Africa and Gulf 
of Aden regions, the number of pirate attacks are usually 
on the low side.  As the weather gets better, the number of 
attacks usually increases.108 
“The decline in the number of attacks in 2010 is due 
to the reduction in incidents in the Gulf of Aden with 22 
incidents in 2010 compared to 86 in 2009.”109  With this 
reduction in the Gulf of Aden comes an increase in attacks 
in other regions.  “Attacks in the Somali basin and the 
wider Indian Ocean have increased from 44 in 2009 to 51 in 
2010.”110  The decline in pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden 
and HOA regions can be attributed to the increased patrols 
the navies around the world are conducting.  
The next level of response to maritime piracy involves 
individual navies.  The military patrols along with the 
diplomatic approach towards combating piracy have 
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contributed to the results the world is seeing currently.  
“The actions of the navies in the Gulf of Aden have been 
instrumental in bringing down the attacks here.”111  
However, the naval patrols need to continue and focus more 
on the Indian Ocean region.  With the increased naval 
presence in the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa Region, the 
Somali pirates have shifted their operations to the Indian 
Ocean where there is less of a presence from the 
international navies.112   
Issues that organizations like the International 
Maritime Bureau are facing when trying to gather 
statistical information and analyze trends of the Somali 
pirates in order to assist the international “fight” on 
piracy includes the lack of cooperation from the commercial 
vessels.  Many commercial vessels are hesitant to report an 
act of piracy.  This is because once they report the act, 
their insurance premiums will most likely go up.  It is 
usually easier for larger shipping companies to absorb the 
cost of paying a ransom for one ship rather than increasing 
their insurance premiums for their fleet of commercial 
vessels. 
To offer military support, the Maritime Security 
Center Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) instituted the 
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC). With 
this in place, military personnel are placed tactically 
throughout the area. With protection by sea and air, ships 
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can maneuver safely through these dangerous waters.113  
These corridors are to assist the masters of the commercial 
vessels in establishing a safe route to and from their 
destination.  However, transiting these suggested corridors 
do not relieve the masters of the vessels to their 
responsibility to the safety and security of their ship and 
crew.  There have been commercial vessels which were 
attacked/hijacked in the recommended transit corridors.114   
Because Somalia is a failed state, it is important to 
address the need for improvement in its government. Arthur 
Bowring suggests that a possible solution to piracy again 
lies in the government. Bowring goes on to advise that only 
with a strong government and effective law enforcement 
agencies can this piracy problem really be faced head on.115   
“Jurisdiction in the fight against piracy is 
universal.”116  It is the duty and responsibility of every 
country to fight the threat on the high seas.  To offer 
full support of this responsibility, the Geneva Convention 
on the High Seas of 1958 and the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, held in 1982, made bold moves. 
Leaders implied that in order to resist and defeat piracy, 
all states must cooperate to the fullest.117  The United 
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States went beyond the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High 
Seas and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea by generating Title 18 of the U.S. Code, section 
1651.  Section 1651 states, anyone on the high seas who 
commits a crime, as per the definition provided by the law 
of nations, and is extradited to or found in the United 
States, shall be imprisoned for life.118  “In cooperating 
with other nations, the United Nations Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA Convention) provides a framework for 
delivery of suspected pirates to coastal nations for 
subsequent prosecution or extradition.”119 
Piracy is the end result of a failed country in 
political turmoil.120  As mentioned earlier, many experts 
feel the way to solve the piracy problem is by producing an 
aggressive diplomatic approach.  The reason for this is 
because the pirates need a safe haven to hide from their 
pursuers.  “Pirates have always needed access to a 
sanctuary or safe area where they could escape their 
pursuers, and which more often than not were protected 
politically and legally rather than because they were 
located in remote regions.”121  If the country of Somalia 
had a legitimate government, one that actively pursued 
pirates and denounced the act of committing a crime on the 
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high seas, only then would the pirates stop.  
Unfortunately, the diplomatic approach is not the only 
thing that will stop the Somali pirates.  With functional 
and aggressive naval tactics, states can put forth a good 
fight against piracy. However, at the end of the day, it 
will not eliminate piracy without diplomatic support.122 
The United States 111th Congress has looked very 
closely to the threat maritime piracy poses.  In July 2009 
Representative Frank Lobiondo introduced the House 
Resolution (H.R.) 3376, the U.S. Mariner and Vessel 
Protection Act of 2009, which aimed to address the use of 
force and the right to self-defense for U.S. mariners who 
were having an act of piracy carried out against them.123  
To further this move, under the new administration, 
President Obama set out to eliminate any further 
development of piracy in the region of the Horn of 
Africa.124  Along with the four United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions mentioned earlier (1816, 1838, 1846, 
and 1851), on May 26, 2009 Resolution 1872 was adopted.  
This Resolution “authorizes member states to participate in 
the training and equipping of the Somali Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) security forces in accordance with 
Resolution 1772.”125  Resolution 1772 was passed in 2007, 
its main task was to ensure all essential steps were taken 
which would facilitate an open dialogue and reconciliation 
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in Somalia.  They would accomplish this by supporting “with 
the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those 
involved with the ongoing National Reconciliation 
Congress.”126  President Obama’s Administration has 
continued to combat the maritime piracy threat by also 
establishing a multilateral Contact Group on Piracy off the 
Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) in January 2009.  This group was 
established to coordinate the anti-piracy efforts with 
various countries and organizations.  Such as the United 
States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 
European Union (EU), regional and other naval forces in and 
around the coast of Somalia.  These assets are being led by 
a U.S. Task Force, CTF-151.127 
The official U.S. response to maritime piracy came in 
June 2007 when then President George W. Bush affixed Annex 
B, Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other Acts of 
Violence at Sea to the National Maritime Security 
Strategy.128  Annex B allowed the full use of the national 
methods of power in the form of diplomatic, military, 
intelligence, economic, law enforcement, and judicial.  
These methods can and should be used simultaneously to 
achieve the best result in the fight against piracy.  Annex 
B was developed to “engage States, international and 
regional organizations to develop greater resources,  
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capacity, and authorities to repress piracy, and maximize 
inclusion of coalition assets in piracy repression 
operations.”129 
The main focus for the United States Administration 
was an increased focus on the multilateral cooperation and 
action to solve the problem of Somali piracy.  In December 
2008, the National Security Council published a tailored 
employment plan known as the Countering Piracy off the Horn 
of Africa Partnership & Action Plan (CPAP).  The CPAP aims 
at developing a blockade of state and non-state 
partnerships.  Together these partnerships and blockades 
can help enforce possible solutions.130  CPAP focuses the 
United States along with a worldwide partnership, to 
address three lines of operation: 
Prevent pirate attacks by reducing the 
vulnerability of the maritime domain to piracy…2.  
Interrupt and terminate acts of piracy consistent 
with international law and rights and 
responsibilities of coastal and flag States…3.  
Ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are 
held accountable for their actions by 
facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates 
by flag, victim, and coastal States, and, in 
appropriate cases, the United States.131 
“Consistent with the President’s Policy, this Plan 
directs three distinct lines of action.”  Nested in these 
lines of action are five essential implementation pillars: 
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…improving operational and intelligence support 
to counter-piracy operations; strengthening 
judicial frameworks for detention and prosecution 
of pirates; disrupting pirate financial 
operations; strengthening commercial shipping 
self-defense capabilities; and pursuing 
diplomatic and public information efforts to 
discourage piracy.132 
The CPAP is the President of the United States policy 
on how to fight the maritime piracy threat.  As previously 
mentioned, his policy will work as long as the U.S. works 
hand in hand with their partners around the world.   
C. CONCLUSION 
The United Nations, along with the United States, have 
been working diligently on determining the correct approach 
to successfully stopping the threat of maritime piracy.  As 
outlined throughout this chapter, the most successful way 
to defeat this threat is by a combination of diplomatic and 
military means.  The results will not be noticed overnight.  
It will take several years to witness any sort of decrease 
in maritime attacks.   
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) keeps an up to 
date detailed record of each maritime attack that takes 
place.  Since the reappearance in the 1990’s of maritime 
piracy, the recorded number of attacks has varied widely.  
In 2000 and 2003 there was a reported 400 attacks, but by 
2006 there were only 239 reported attacks.  The reason for 
the decrease in attacks in 2006 was due to counter-piracy 
operations.  The 239 recorded attacks in 2006 was a number 
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not seen since 1998.133  After 2006, the number of attacks 
increased yet again and have been fluctuating from 263 to 
406 ever since.134  This again supports the effort that 
militaries and governments need to work together in order 
to combat piracy.  It simply cannot be done with one and 
not the other. 
 
 
                     
133 ICC International Maritime Bureau, “Piracy and Armed Robbery 










As noted earlier, while many people believe piracy to 
be something daring and magical as depicted through Disney 
movies, the reality is that piracy is a real and ever 
growing threat to seafarers.  This thesis has shown that 
piracy has had a large impact not only physically, but 
financially on society as a whole.  Efforts to combat this 
international problem have fallen short.  The use of 
military forces temporarily suppressed piracy as did 
diplomatic measures.  This further supports the notion that 
combinations of strong military and diplomatic efforts are 
needed to effectively combat global piracy. 
This thesis focused on shedding light on the impact of 
piracy, and it did just that.  In searching for a 
definitive number in terms of the financial impact of 
piracy on the globe, it was found that such a number does 
not exist. Rather, with a great hesitation to report actual 
pirate attacks for fear of a rise in insurance premiums, 
companies have made defining the financial impact of piracy 
a true challenge.  However, what research does provide is 
the notion that the world’s economy cannot function 
smoothly so long as piracy constantly threats its security.  
The research for this thesis suggests that even though it 
is difficult to pinpoint the exact economic impact of 
global piracy, it is obvious that it does have a negative 





Pirates continue to offer a challenge to the navies 
around the world, in that they have expanded their 
attacking ground from the coast of Somalia.  While still 
centrally located off the coast of Somalia and in the Horn 
of Africa, pirates have extended their attacks all over the 
world.  “Central Somalia has produced the most aggressive 
forms of piracy–well organized, clan related, and 
determined.”135  As a result, the responsibility of 
addressing global piracy has expanded to more countries of 
the world, requiring them to “work with international 
organizations and the shipping industry to confront and 
repress any and all piracy threats to the global shipping 
and freedom of navigation in which it depends on.”136  This 
not only denotes the need for the United States Navy to 
help protect these undermanned areas, but also further 
supports the argument that not only do military and 
diplomatic efforts need to work together to fight piracy, 
but that society would also benefit from international 
collaboration as well.  
Through a collaborative military and diplomatic 
effort, the United States State Department has reported the 
lowest number of pirate attacks on ships off the coast of 
Somalia in the past year.137  While research offered 
numerous ways to combat this threat, this combination seems 
the most effective.  Enforcing solutions such as the United 
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Nations Security Council resolutions 1816, 1838, 1846 and 
1851 along with increased military patrols will help 
decrease the amount of attacks, but, much like terrorism 
has continued to plague the world despite best efforts of 
mankind to eradicate it, the problem of maritime piracy is 
likely to remain with us for the foreseeable future.  The 
best option for global interests to minimize piracy is to 
continue the combination of the support of defensive 
measures along with the offensive tactics provided by 
various navies around the world.  Thus, even though the 
threat will remain, there are effective mechanisms 
available to states and militaries in their efforts to 
combat this international problem.  
Piracy has been, and will continue to be an active 
threat on the high seas.  It is the responsibility of all 
the navies and diplomacies in the world to combat this 
growing issue.  Currently, there are roughly 20 countries 
taking part in combating the threat of piracy, but with the 
expansion from Somalia, more countries need to be involved 
in this process.  Through the cooperation of other 
countries around the world, this ever growing threat can 
and will be reduced.   
A. SUMMARY 
To recap, Chapter I gave a brief overview into why 
maritime piracy is a relevant threat to the countries 
around the world.  Chapter II presented the reader with a 
brief history of maritime piracy and examined how this 
threat is a real and growing issue.  Chapter III discussed 




throughout the countries and companies throughout the 
world.  Finally, Chapter IV introduced some of the possible 
and current solutions to the maritime piracy threat.  These 
solutions include a combination of diplomatic and military 
operations. 
Piracy will never be completely eradicated but through 
diplomatic and military means the threat can be greatly 
reduced.  The owners of the commercial vessels must 
continue to report any and all activities of maritime 
piracy they witness.  If they are boarded and requested to 
make a ransom payment, the owner of the vessel must report 
all the details to the IMB.  The IMB keeps detailed records 
of each attack in order to establish trends and assistance 
in eradicating the threat of maritime piracy.  While the 
overall impact of piracy has yet to be determined, the fact 
remains that sea piracy, either directly or indirectly, 
affects citizens on an international level.  Although this 
problem will likely never be completely eradicated, it is 
necessary, through means of collaborative diplomacy and 
military forces; to work together internationally in order 
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